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THE SUPREME COURT REJECTS FIFTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION AGAINST THE
FORFEITURE OF AN INNOCENT
OWNER'S PROPERTY
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bennis v. Michigan,' the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture
of an automobile in which one of thejoint owners engaged in a sexual
act with an alleged prostitute, notwithstanding the other owner's lack
of knowledge of the misuse of the car.2 In so holding, the Court re-
jected the innocent owner's contention that the forfeiture violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3
In analyzing the petitioner's constitutional claim, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a five-person majority, relied heavily on a "long
and unbroken line" of precedent rejecting an innocent owner defense
to civil forfeiture actions. 4 The Court concluded that the judicial ac-
ceptance of such forfeitures is "too firmly fixed in the punitive and
remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced."5
This Note argues, first, that the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's inter-
est in the automobile is not supported by the justifications tradition-
ally provided by the Supreme Court for abating an innocent owner's
interest in property. Additionally, this Note asserts that, based on Aus-
1 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
2 Id. at 998. The forfeiture was authorized by a Michigan nuisance abatement statute,
MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 600.3801 (West 1991), which provides for the forfeiture of ille-
gally used property without proof of the owner's knowledge of or consent to the illegal use.
3 Id. at 1001. The Due Process Clause provides, in relevant part: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fifth Amendment against the States. Bennis, 116
S. Ct. at 998.
4 Id. at 999.
5 Id. at 1001 (quotingJ.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511
(1921)).
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tin v. United States,6 the majority should have analyzed the forfeiture of
Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car within the framework of the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eight Amendment. Finally, this Note contends
that the Eight Amendment should have. compelled the Court to re-
mand the case to the trial court for determination of the punitive na-
ture of the forfeiture and its proportionality to the offense.
II. BACKGROUND
Civil forfeiture in the United States developed from English com-
mon law.7 Under English law, there were three types of forfeiture: (1)
deodand;8 (2) escheat upon attainder;9 and (3) statutory forfeitures of
"offending objects used in violation of the customs and revenue
laws."10 Of the three types of forfeiture, only statutory forfeiture was
incorporated into American law." However, the courts initially used
the rationales underlying deodands and escheat upon attainder,
namely that the property itself is guilty and that a wrongdoer could
legitimately be deprived of his property, respectively, as justification
for statutory forfeitures in the United States.12
6 509 U.S. 602 (1993). In Austin, the Court determined that a civil forfeiture pursuant
to a federal statute authorizing the confiscation of property used in drug trafficking was, at
least partially, punitive in nature. I- at 622. Thus, the Court held that such forfeiture was
constitutionally limited by the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 1d. at
621. See infra Part ll.B. for a discussion of Austin.
7 See Robert Lieske, Civil Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law With A Common Sense
Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 21 WM. MrrCHEI.L L. Rhv. 265,
271-72 (1995).
8 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974). According to
the doctrine of deodand, an object that directly or indirectly caused the death of a King's
subject was forfeited to the King. Id. This was done under the belief that the King would
then provide money to pay for a religious ceremony for the slain or insure that the object
was put to charitable use. Id Eventually, the deodand became a source of revenue for the
Crown and the forfeitures were justified as "a penalty for carelessness." Id. (citation omit-
ted). According to another source, deodand was premised on the fiction that the property
itself was guilty of the wrongdoing, not as a means of punishing the owner. Lieske, supra
note 7, at 274 (noting that under deodand, a sword causing the death of a person would be
forfeited to the Crown whether or not the sword-owner played a part in the death).
9 Lieske, supra note 7, at 272. Escheat upon attainder was a criminal law doctrine
which allowed the forfeiture of property upon the owner's conviction of a felony. Id. (cita-
tion omitted). It was premised on the common law theory that the King retained superior
title to all property; therefore, property simply reverted back to the King upon the commis-
sion of a crime. ML (citation omitted). The primary function of escheat upon attainder,
however, was to punish the owner for his crime. Id. (citation omitted).
10 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-82.
11 Id. at 682-83.
12 Lieske, supra note 7, at 271-72. See also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827),
discussed infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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A. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FORFEITURE OF AN "INNOCENT OWNER'S"
PROPERTY
Statutory forfeiture in the United States was established early in
the country's history and its practice has continued and expanded
over time.' 3 As the Supreme Court noted in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co.:' 4
"[L] ong before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts
in the Colonies-and later in the States during the period of the Con-
federation-were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of
[English and local] forfeiture statutes," which provided for the forfeiture
of commodities and vessels used in violations of customs and revenue
laws. And, almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution, ships
and cargoes involved in customs offenses were made subject to forfeiture
under federal law, as were vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign coun-
tries, and somewhat later those used to deliver slaves to this country.
The enactment of forfeiture statutes has not abated; contemporary fed-
eral and state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that
might be used in the conduct of criminal enterprise.15
Despite the potential reach of forfeiture statutes, the Supreme Court
has consistently upheld forfeiture statutes when confronted with con-
stitutional challenges by innocent owners. 16 In so doing, the Court
has usually justified the forfeiture on either of two grounds: (1) that
the property itself is guilty of the offense; or (2) that the property
owner may be held accountable for the wrongdoings of those to
whom he entrusts his property. 17
1. The Guilty Property Fiction
The earliest American civil forfeiture cases justifying the forfei-
ture of an innocent owner's property were condemnation actions
against ships for acts of piracy or violations of United States customs
laws.18 In upholding such forfeitures, the Supreme Court invoked the
"guilty property" fiction to justify in rem proceedings directly against
the ship, rather than in personam proceedings against the ship-own-
ers.19 The in rem nature of the admiralty proceedings dispensed with
13 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 683 (brackets in original, internal citations omitted).
16 See, e.g., id.
17 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993).
18 See, e.g., Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
19 Although the "guilty property" fiction is reminiscent of the justification for forfeiture
under the law of deodand, the use of the fiction in admiralty proceedings may have devel-
oped out of necessity and practicality, rather than as a genuine belief that the property
itself was guilty of wrongdoing. See Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of
Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MiAMi L. RE'. 911, 936-38 (1991).
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the requirement of proving any underlying wrongdoing on the part of
the property owner.
In The Palmyra,20 the United States Supreme Court determined
that a statutory, in rem forfeiture of property was "independent of,
and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam"
against the property owner.21 Pursuant to an act of Congress authoriz-
ing the capture and condemnation of any vessel from which piratical
aggression was attempted or made, the United States sought the for-
feiture of a ship, The Palmyra, suspected of privateering 22 under a com-
mission from the King of Spain.2 3 The ship owner asserted that the
government could not maintain the condemnation action because he
had not been criminally convicted of privateering.2 4 Rejecting this
contention, the Court reasoned that "[t] he thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily
to the thing."2 Furthermore, the Court noted that acceptance of the
ship owner's argument would prohibit the forfeiture of any vessel pur-
suant to the act of Congress because there was no authorization for
the criminal punishment of one who commits piratical aggression.2 6
Since such a requirement would make the statute inoperable, the
Court held that a criminal conviction was not necessary to enforce an
in rem forfeiture of this nature.2 7
Similarly, in Harmony v. United States28 the Court upheld the for-
feiture of a ship for acts of piracy notwithstanding the ship owners'
lack of knowledge or authorization of the aggressions.29 In Harmony,
a ship, armed with the usual equipment for an innocent commercial
voyage, committed acts of aggression that were admittedly outside the
Piety discusses Holmes's theory that in rem proceedings against ships developed because
the ship was the only security available when dealing with foreigners. It (citing O.W.
Houm~s, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881)). Seizing the vessel was a way to obtain jurisdiction
over a foreigner or to ensure a remedy for a citizen, rather than forcing the citizen to
search for a remedy abroad. Id.
20 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
21 Id. at 15.
22 "Privateer" is defined as: "An armed private vessel which bears the commission of the
sovereign power to cruise against the commerce or war vessels of the enemy." WEISTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DicrIoNARY 1969 (2d ed. 1945).
23 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 8.
24 Id. at 12.
25 Id. at 14.
26 Id. at 15.
27 Id. at 15.
28 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). This case is sometimes referred to as United States v.
The Brig Malek AdheL See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684
(1974).
29 Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233-34.
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contemplation of the ship owner.8 0 The Court reasoned that treating
the vessel as the offender was the "only adequate means of sup-
pressing the offence or wrong, or insuring indemnity to the injured
party."31 As further support for attaching the offense to the vessel, the
Court reasoned that, because a ship is guided by its crew and master,
it was not unreasonable that the master's actions affect the ship.32
Outside the realm of admiralty law, the Court continued to prem-
ise the forfeiture of illegally-used property on the notion that the of-
fense attaches directly to the property.3 3 In addition, the Court began
to examine the relationship between the property owner and the per-
son using the property illegally.34 In Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States,35 the Court upheld the forfeiture of the real and personal prop-
erty of a distillery occupied and operated by a lessee who failed to
maintain the distillery's business records in accordance with United
States revenue laws.3 6 The Court maintained that the forfeiture ac-
tion attached to the distillery and did not require proof of the lessor-
owner's knowledge that the lessee committed fraud upon the govern-
ment.8 7 The Court explained that the fact that the lessor-owner con-
sented to his land being used as a distillery put him in the same place
as if he was the distiller, and subjected the land to forfeiture just as if
the distiller was the owner.38 In conclusion, the Court determined
that by virtue of the lease, the acts of the lessee bind the lessor-owner
and the consequences to the property were the same as if the owner
committed the illegal acts.39
2. The Entrustment Theory
Although the use of the "guilty property" fiction in Anierican civil
forfeiture actions operates under the premise that the guilt or inno-
cence of the property owner is irrelevant, the Supreme Court's appli-
30 Id. at 230.
31 Id. at 233.
32 Id. at 234 (quoting United States v. The Schooner Little Charles, F. Cas. 979, 982
(C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612)). The court also discussed the notion that "the acts of the
master and crew... bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or
guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to
the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs." Id. at 234. However, the basis of
the Court's judgment of forfeiture was the ship's accountability for the wrongdoing, not
the owner's accountability for the illegal acts of the crew. Id.
33 See, e.g., Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
34 See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Van Oster
v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 395.
35 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
36 Id. at 396 (citation omitted).
37 Id. at 399.
38 Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
39 Id. at 404.
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cation of the "guilty property" fiction rests on the "notion that the
owner who allows his property to become involved in an offense has
been negligent."40 Thus, while not requiring a showing of guilt on the
part of the property owner, in the later cases upholding the forfeiture
of an innocent owner's property, the Court investigated whether the
property owner actually entrusted the misused property to the wrong-
doer.41 Upon finding an entrustment by an innocent owner, the
Court justified forfeiture as a means of deterring owners from trans-
ferring their property to those who may misuse it.42
In Van Oster v. Kansas,43 the Court, in upholding the forfeiture of
an automobile used to transport alcohol illegally, offered a rationale
other than the "guilty property" fiction for allowing the forfeiture of
property misused without the owner's knowledge or consent.44 The
Court determined that the government was justified in "visiting upon
the owner of property, the unpleasant consequences of the unauthor-
ized action of one to whom he has intrusted [sic] it."45 The Court
began by noting that a State's police power permits it to declare cer-
tain uses of property undesirable and to subject the property to forfei-
ture if the owner so uses it.46 The Court then reasoned that an owner
surrenders control of his property at his own peril and, by subjecting
property to forfeiture for the illegal acts of those to whom the prop-
erty is entrusted, the law "builds a secondary defense against a forbid-
den use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of
judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged
innocent owner."47 As such, the Court determined that the State val-
idly exercised its police power by forfeiting the car.48 For that reason
as well as the well-settled precedents allowing forfeiture of property
entrusted by innocent owners to wrongdoers,49 the Court held that
the forfeiture did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.50
40 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 616 (1993).
41 See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 663; Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
42 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
43 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
44 Id at 467-68.
45 Id. at 467.
46 Id. at 466-67.
47 Id. at 466.
48 Id., 272 U.S. at 468. The Court explicitly reserved judgment as to whether a State's
police power would extend to the forfeiture of property which had been stolen from the
owner and then misused. Id. at 467. Thus, the Court also implicitly reserved judgment as
to the constitutionality of such a forfeiture.
49 Id. (citingj.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dob-




Similarly, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,51 the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican statute providing
grounds for the forfeiture of a boat upon which marijuana was found,
notwithstanding the boat-leasing company's lack of knowledge of the
lessee's criminal activity.52 After surveying the forfeiture precedents,
the Court concluded that the Puerto Rican forfeiture statute fur-
thered punitive and deterrent purposes that had traditionally sufficed
to withstand the constitutional challenges made by innocent owners. 53
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that application of forfeiture pro-
visions to "lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of
any wrongdoing... may have the desirable effect of inducing them to
exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property."' 4
Concluding that the leasing company did not allege, nor offer proof,
that it "did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put
to unlawful use," the Court upheld the confiscation.55
Although the Supreme Court has consistently declined to limit
the government's power to forfeit the property of innocent owners,
the Court offered some protection against abuse of this power by ap-
plying the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfei-
ture in Austin v. United States.56
B. APPLICATION OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO CIVIL FORFEITURE
In Austin, the Supreme Court again addressed the constitutional-
ity of civil forfeiture; however, the attack was not a due process claim
by an innocent owner. 57 Rather, the Court examined whether the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to a civil forfei-
51 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
52 Id. at 669.
53 Id. at 686.
54 Id. at 688. (citing United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 DeLuxe Coach, 307 U.S.
219, 238-41 (1939) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). The Calero-Toledo Court went on to opine
that the "broad sweep" of forfeiture statutes could give rise to "serious constitutional ques-
tions" in other circumstances. I&e at 689. For example, the court noted that it "would be
difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfei-
ture had been taken from him without his privity or consent." rd (citing Van Oster v.
United States, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926); J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 505, 512 (1921)). Furthermore, the Court stated that:
[T]he same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in
and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circum-
stance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and
was not unduly oppressive.
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
55 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
56 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
57 Id. at 604.
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ture.58 In holding that the Excessive Fines Clause limited the
government's power to confiscate property, the Court examined both
the historical purpose of civil forfeiture and the history of the Eighth
Amendment. 59 The Court first noted that the text of the Excessive
Fines Clause, unlike other constitutional provisions, did not limit its
protection to the context of criminal proceedings. 60 Furthermore,
the Court noted that the historical purpose of the provision was to
"prevent the government from abusing its power to punish."6' Thus,
the Court concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to any
punitive governmental action, either civil or criminal in nature.62
Next, the Court addressed whether civil forfeiture generally
serves a punitive purpose.63 The Austin Court examined the history of
civil forfeiture both in English and American law and concluded that
forfeiture generally, and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular, serve
as punishment.64 Furthermore, the Court noted that even its deci-
sions upholding the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property, under
either the guilty property or entrustment theories, "rest, at bottom, on
the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his property
to be misused and that he is properly punished for that negligence."65
The Court also examined the history of the particular forfeiture
statute applied in Austin and reached the conclusion that, like civil
forfeiture generally, the specific statute served punitive purposes.66
The Court rejected the government's claim that forfeitures of instru-
ments of the drug trade were remedial and compensatory in nature.67
Noting that the government possesses a remedial interest in confiscat-
ing contraband, the Court emphasized that the property at issue in
58 Id.
59 Id. at 608-18.
60 Id. at 607-10. The Court compared the Excessive Fines Clause to the Self-Incrimina-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment which states: "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. at 607 (citing U.S. CONsr. amend. V).
61 Id. at 607 (citing Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264-
68, 286-97 (1989)).
62 Id. at 610.
63 I
64 Id. at 618. The Court noted that forfeiture may also serve a remedial'purpose, but
concluded that, as long as it is at least partially punitive, it is subject to the limitation of the
Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 610.
65 Id. at 615 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683
(1974);J.W. GoldsmithJr.-Grant C6. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's Dis-
tillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210
(1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
66 Id. at 619-22. In Austin, the government sought the forfeiture of a mobile home and
an auto body shop pursuant to a federal statute authorizing the forfeiture of property used
in drug trafficking. 1d. at 604-05 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a) (4) and (a)(7) (1988)).
67 Id- at 620-21.
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Austin, a mobile home and an auto-body shop, were not contraband. 68
Furthermore, the Court stated that the "dramatic variations in the
value of conveyances and real property forfeitable under §§ 881 (a) (4)
and (a) (7) undercut any ... argument" that the forfeitures serve to
compensate the government for the cost of law enforcement.69 Thus,
the Court concluded that the forfeiture in Austin was subject to the
limitation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.70
The Austin Court declined to promulgate a test for determining
when a civil forfeiture is constitutionally excessive.7' Rather, the
Court remanded the case to the trial court for such determination. 72
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of October 3, 1988, two police officers observed a
woman "flagging" passing vehicles on a street corner in a Detroit
neighborhood reputed for prostitution. 73 The officers set up surveil-
lance and witnessed a 1977 Pontiac, driven by John Bennis, pick the
woman up, then drive a block away and park.74 The officers ap-
proached the vehicle, shined a flashlight into the car and observed
the woman and Mr. Bennis engaged in a sexual act.75 Mr. Bennis was
subsequently arrested for and convicted of gross indecency in viola-
tion of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.338b.76
In addition to the criminal prosecution for gross indecency, the
prosecutor for Wayne County filed a civil complaint against both John
Bennis and his wife, Tina Bennis, as joint owners of the 1977 Pon-
tiac.77 The prosecutor sought to have the car declared a public nui-
sance subject to forfeiture under Michigan's public nuisance law.78
68 Id. at 621 (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699
(1965)).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 622.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486, 488 (Mich. 1994). The court described
"flagging" as "the manner in which prostitutes solicit business from potential customers in
passing vehicles." Id. at 486 n.2.
74 Id. at 486.
75 Id.
76 Id. (citing MIcH. COMp. Lws ANN. § 750.338b (West 1991)).
77 Id
78 Id MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.3801 (West 1991) provides in relevant part:
Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assig-
nation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or
other disorderly persons .... is declared a nuisance, . . . and all... nuisances shall be
enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any
person or his or her servant, agent or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or main-
tains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in
this section is guilty of a nuisance.
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In an unreported decision issued from the bench, the trial judge
determined that Mr. Bennis had engaged in an act of lewdness and
ordered the forfeiture of the Bennises' automobile. 79 Furthermore,
he ordered the vehicle's sale with the proceeds to be used to cover the
costs of prosecution and law enforcement, with any remainder to be
turned over to the State.80
At trial, Mrs. Bennis testified that she had no knowledge that her
husband would use their car to solicit prostitutes, nor did she know
that, on the day of the incident, he would use the car for any purpose
other than to come directly home from work.81 In determining that
both Mr. and Mrs. Bennis's interests in the car should be abated, the
judge commented that, under other circumstances, he would have
considered the independent interest of Mrs. Bennis in the automo-
bile.82 In this case, however, he would not do so because the Bennises
owned another automobile and because there would be "practically
nothing left" of the sale proceeds after deducting the relevant costs. 83
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision
on several grounds.8 4 First, the court held that, as a matter of law,
Michigan's nuisance statute required the prosecution to prove that
Mrs. Bennis knew of her husband's use of the vehicle as a nuisance
before the vehicle could be abated.85 Second, the court found that,
given the facts of this case, the prosecution failed to prove that Mrs.
Bennis had such knowledge. 86 Additionally, the court determined
that the single incident in the Bennis vehicle was insufficient to create
a nuisance for the purpose of the statute because a reasonable infer-
ence could not be drawn that such conduct was habitual.87 Moreover,
Furthermore, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3825 (West 1979) authorizes prosecuting at-
torneys to bring an action to abate the nuisance.
79 Brief for Petitioner at 1, 5, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
80 Id. at 6.
81 Id. at 5.
82 Id. at 5 n.4.
83 Id.
84 Michigan v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
85 Id at 733. The Michigan appellate court recognized that requiring the prosecution
to prove such knowledge is contrary to the plain language of the statute which provides
that "[p] roof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendant
or any of them, is not required." MICH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 600.3815 (West 1991). How-
ever, the court concluded that, regardless of the statutory language, proof of knowledge is
required for abatement under the statute based on the Michigan Supreme Court decisions
in People v. Schoonmaker, 216 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1927) (holding that the abatement statute
does not deprive an owner of his property unless he consented to or acquiesced in the
illegal use of the property) and State v. Levenburg, 280 N.W.2d 810 (Mich. 1979) (holding
that ajudgment for abatement could not be rendered without a finding that the property
owner or operator knew of and acquiesced to the solicitation occurring on the property).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 733-34 (citing State v. Motorama Motel Corp., 307 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997]
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the court found that since the prosecution offered no proof that Mr.
Bennis paid money in exchange for sex, his conduct did not consti-
tute lewdness to the extent required to subject the vehicle to forfei-
ture under the statute. 88
The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court and
reinstated the trial court's order forfeiting the Bennis' automobile. 89
The court found that Mr. Bennis had engaged in an act of lewdness
squarely within the purview of the nuisance statute. 90 Furthermore,
the court determined that Mr. Bennis's single act of lewdness suffi-
ciently constituted a nuisance given that the act occurred in an area
known for prostitution, thereby contributing to an already existing
public nuisance. 91 Finally, the court held that the statute did not re-
quire proof of Mrs. Bennis's knowledge of the nuisance in order to
forfeit her interest in the vehicle. 92
After determining that the Michigan statute subjected Mrs. Ben-
nis's interest in the car to forfeiture, the court examined the constitu-
tional significance of the abatement.93 The court assumed that Mrs.
Bennis did not have knowledge of or consent to her husband's illegal
use of the vehicle. 94 Examining the decisions in Van Oste' 5 and
Calero-Toledo,96 the court determined that the United States Supreme
Court allows forfeiture of an innocent owner's property based on mis-
use of the property by others.97 Specifically, the court relied on Van
Oster, citing the Supreme Court's rejection of an innocent owner's
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim when the offense was
"committed by one entrusted by the owner with the possession and
use of the offending vehicle."98 The court noted that Mrs. Bennis, as a
joint owner of the car, explicitly or implicitly entrusted Mr. Bennis
1981) (holding that a single incident of solicitation for prostitution in a bar was insufficient
to create a nuisance unless a reasonable inference could be drawn that the conduct was
habitual)).
88 Id at 734-35 (citing State v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 240 N.W.2d 460 (Mich.
1976)).
89 Bennis v. Michigan, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. 1994).
90 Id at 487.
91 Id at 490-92.
92 Id. at 492.
93 Id. at 498-94.
94 Id. at 493.
95 Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926).
96 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
97 Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 494 (citing Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467; Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at
689). However, the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court's opinions indicated that
there would be a constitutional limitation upon the forfeiture of property stolen from the
owner and then misused or property that was used without the owner's consent or knowl-
edge. Id. (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689).
98 Id. (quoting Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467).
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with use of the vehicle. 99 The court thus held that the abatement of
Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car did not violate the Constitution. 100
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 01 to deter-
mine if forfeiture of the Bennises' car pursuant to Michigan's abate-
ment statute deprived Tina Bennis of her interest in the forfeited
automobile without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or constituted a taking of her property for public use
without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.102
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,10 3 the Court affirmed
the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, holding that the forfei-
ture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in the automobile, despite her lack of
knowledge of or consent to the illegal use of the car, offended neither
the Due Process Clause nor the Takings Clause of the Constitution. 10 4
Initially, the Court noted that the basis of Mrs. Bennis's due pro-
cess claim was not that the State denied her notice or an opportunity
to contest the forfeiture of her interest in the car.10 5 Rather, Mrs.
Bennis claimed an entitlement to contest the abatement by establish-
ing her lack of knowledge that her husband would use the vehicle to
violate the law.10 6 In rejecting this claim, the Court examined a "long
and unbroken line of cases" holding that an owner's interest in prop-
erty could be forfeited because of others' illegal use of the property
regardless of whether the owner knew the property would be put to
such use. 107
Chief Justice Rehnquist began by examining The Palmyra,108 in
which the United States sought the forfeiture of a ship that the King
of Spain commissioned as a privateer and which attacked a United
States vessel.10 9 Considering the vessel, not the owner, as the of-
fender, the Supreme Court rejected the owner's contention that the
99 Id.
100 Id. at 494-95.
101 Bennis v. Michigan, 115 S. Ct. 2275 (1995).
102 Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996).
103 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburgjoined ChiefJustice Rehnquist's
opinion.




108 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text for a
discussion of The Palmyra
109 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
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ship could not be forfeited until he was convicted of privateering.110
Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to another admiralty case, Harmony v.
United States' for the proposition that a ship owner impliedly submits
the vessel to forfeiture for the unlawful acts of ship's master and crew,
regardless of the owner's guilt.1 2
Next, ChiefJustice Rehnquist surveyed cases outside the realm of
admiralty law to further support the Court's position that an innocent
owner's interest may be subject to forfeiture for the wrongful acts of
those to whom the owner entrusts the property." 3 The majority opin-
ion highlighted Van Oster,1"4 in which the Court upheld the forfeiture
of a car used to illegally transport alcohol, despite the owner's claimed
lack of knowledge or authorization of the illegal transport." 5 Fur-
thermore, the Court emphasized the well-established principle that
due process does not protect an owner against the consequences of
the unlawful acts of those to whom the owner entrusts the property." 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist found Mrs. Bennis's position to be indistin-
guishable from the position of the various property owners in the
precedential forfeiture cases." 7
After surveying the forfeiture precedents, the majority rejected
Mrs. Bennis's assertions that the Court's prior decisions left open the
possibility that she should be afforded constitutional protection
against the confiscation of her property." 8 First, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist disposed of Mrs. Bennis's reliance on a passage from the opinion
in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co."a9 as misplaced, characteriz-
ing the passage as "obiter dictum." 20 In Calero-Toledo, the Court ac-
knowledged that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional
claim" of an owner who was unaware of the criminal use of his prop-
erty and who had done everything reasonable to prevent such use.' 21
However, the Calero-Toledo Court went on to uphold the forfeiture of
the interest of a yacht leasing company in a yacht which the lessee
used to transport drugs even though the company had no knowledge
1l0 Id. (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14).
11' 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). See also supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text dis-
cussing Harmony.
112 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (citing Harmony, 43 U.S. at 210).
113 Id. (citing Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878); Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 465-68 (1926)).
114 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
115 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (citing Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465-66).
116 Id. (citing Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465-66).
117 Id. at 999.
118 Id.
1"9 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
120 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
121 Id. (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689).
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of or involvement in the criminal activity.122 Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that Mrs. Bennis's claim fell within the Calera-Toledo holding. 123
Next, the Court acknowledged that previous forfeiture cases spe-
cifically reserved the question of whether an innocent owner's interest
in illegally-used property could be forfeited when the property had
been stolen from the owner or used without the owner's knowledge or
consent.124 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that since
Mr. Bennis was a co-owner of the vehicle, the Court was not required
to make such a determination in this case.' 25
Furthermore, the ChiefJustice rejected Mrs. Bennis's suggestion
that the Court overrule the precedents "by importing a culpability re-
quirement from cases having at best a tangential relation to the 'inno-
cent owner' doctrine of the forfeiture cases."' 26 Mrs. Bennis cited
Foucha v. Louisiana,127 for the proposition that a criminal defendant
cannot be punished for a crime without proof that he is guilty.' 28 The
majority found unpersuasive Mrs. Bennis' argument that the Foucha
holding mandated that Michigan demonstrate a punitive interest in
forfeiting Mrs. Bennis's interest in the vehicle. 129 Reservingjudgment
on whether the forfeiture proceeding was punitive, the Court stated
that the Foucha decision did not discuss, let alone overrule the forfei-
ture cases. 130
Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed Mrs. Bennis's reli-
ance on the Austin Court's holding that the Excessive Fines Clause
limits the scope of civil forfeiture.13' Mrs. Bennis argued that the Aus-
tin holding "would be difficult to reconcile with any rule allowing truly
innocent persons to be punished by civil forfeiture."1 32 ChiefJustice
122 Id. (citing Caero-Toledo, 419 U.S. at 668).
123 Id.
124 Ie- at 999 n.5 (citingJ.W. GoldsmithJr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512
(1921)).
125 Id-
126 Id. at 1000.
127 504 U.S. 71 (1992). In Foucha, the Supreme Court held that a defendant found not
guilty by reason of insanity could not be confined indefinitely unless the State showed that
the defendant was either dangerous or mentally ill. The Foucha Court reasoned that with-
out a showing of dangerousness or insanity, the State had no "punitive interest" to justify
detention. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80). Thus, Mrs. Bennis
argued that Michigan had to demonstrate a valid punitive purpose for forfeiting her inter-
est in the vehicle before the State could impose that "punishment" upon her. See Bennis,
115 S. Ct. at 1000.








Rehnquist noted that the Austin Court did not address the validity of
the "innocent-owner defense," except to opine that the existence of
such a defense in the forfeiture statute evidenced the punitive nature
of the forfeiture.5 5 Furthermore, he noted that Michigan's abate-
ment proceedings were not purely punitive, but, rather, were equita-
ble actions in which the trial court had remedial discretion to
consider alternatives other than abating the entire interest in the vehi-
cle.' 34 The Court also pointed out that forfeiture served a deterrent
purpose distinct from punishment.135
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed Mrs. Bennis's Fifth
Amendment claim.'5 6 The Court determined that Michigan lawfully
acquired the Bennises' vehicle because the forfeiture did not offend
due process.'5 7 Noting that the government is not required to com-
pensate an owner for property lawfully taken, other than through the
exercise of eminent domain, the Court held that the State was not
required to compensate Mrs. Bennis for her interest. 138
B. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that acknowledged
the apparent inequity of allowing the State to forfeit a property
owner's interest without proving any wrongdoing by the property
owner.139 He pointed out, however, that the Constitution does not
prohibit all that is undesirable. 140 Justice Thomas also reiterated the
majority's position that the Constitution permits the forfeiture of an
innocent owner's property and that precedent supports such
forfeitures. 141
Justice Thomas noted the State has a valid, remedial interest in
abating the vehicle to prevent future criminal activity and deducting
the costs of law enforcement from the sale proceeds. 142 Furthermore,
as the trial court determined that a division of the proceeds would
yield almost nothing, Justice Thomas characterized the forfeiture of
133 Bennis, 116 S. CL at 1000.
134 Id. (citing Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 495 (Mich. 1994)).
135 Id. (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974)).
136 Id. at 1001.
137 See id.
138 Id. (citing United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973)).
139 Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J, concurring).
140 Id. at 1001-02 (Thomas, J., concurring).
141 See id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas suggested that a more ap-
propriate limitation on the State's right to forfeit property would be to strictly construe
what may be considered an instrumentality of crime for purposes of abatement. Id. How-
ever, Mrs. Bennis did not assert that the vehicle was not an instrumentality of her hus-
band's crime. Id.
142 See ia. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Mrs. Bennis's interest in the vehicle without compensation as reme-
dial, rather than punitive. 14 Therefore, Justice Thomas reasoned that
the forfeiture avoided the problems associated with imposing punish-
ment upon an innocent individual.14 4
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion to "highlight features
of the case key to [her] judgment"' 45 She began by noting that the
car belonged to John Bennisjust as much as it belonged to Tina Ben-
nis, and, at all times, he had her permission to use it.146 Justice Gins-
burg emphasized that no one contested Michigan's right to forfeit the
automobile. 147 She pointed out that the sole question was whether
Tina Bennis had a constitutional right to a portion of the proceeds
from the sale of the car.148
Justice Ginsburg noted that Michigan's abatement proceedings
are "equitable action[s]," which the Michigan Supreme Court "stands
ready to police" against "exorbitant application" and "inequitable ad-
ministration."1 49 Furthermore, she emphasized that the trial court
based its decision not to divide the proceeds of the sale on the practi-
cal consideration that the age and value of the forfeited car left almost
nothing to be divided and that the Bennises had another car.150 In
short, the trial court had not acted "blatantly unfairly," nor had the
State "embarked on an experiment to punish innocent third par-
ties." 151 Thus, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, Michigan's endeavor to rid
its neighborhoods of illicit activity did not warrant the Court's
disapproval. 152
D. JUSTICE STEVENS'S DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented due to his belief that the majority's deci-
sion would allow the government "virtually unbridled power" to con-
fiscate property used in illegal acts.' 58 Furthermore, he disagreed
with the majority's "apparent assumption" that the Constitution im-
143 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
144 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
145 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
146 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
147 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
148 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
149 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
150 Id (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
151 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
152 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).




posed no limitation on the government's authority to seize property
from innocent owners.154 Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that the for-
feiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car should have been reversed
on due process grounds and as a violation of the Excessive Fines
Clause. 155
Justice Stevens began his analysis by dividing seizable property
into three categories: pure contraband; proceeds of criminal activity;
and the instrumentalities of crime. 156 Pure contraband, Justice Ste-
vens explained, is property of which possession constitutes a crime. 157
While he acknowledged the government's remedial interest in confis-
cating such property irrespective of the owner's blameworthiness, he
noted that a car was not contraband.158
Justice Stevens next explained that the second category of forfeit-
able goods, proceeds of criminal activity, had traditionally covered
only stolen property, which was justifiably confiscated and returned to
the original owner upon restitutionary grounds. 159 He noted that the
enlargement of the category to cover earnings from various illegal ac-
tivities was not problematic because most of the federal forfeiture stat-
utes include protections for innocent owners. 160 Furthermore, he
found the inclusion of the innocent owner provision in the federal
statutes to be persuasive of the notion that fairness requires considera-
tion of an innocent owner's property rights.' 6 1
Finally, Justice Stevens noted that forfeiture in the third category,
property used in the commission of crime, is more problematic. 62
He reasoned that forfeiture of such property can have a very broad
reach and the government's remedial interest in confiscation is less
evident. 163 Reviewing the admiralty precedents in this category, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded that they were distinguishable from Mrs. Ben-
nis' case for two reasons. 164 First, the principal use of Mrs. Bennis's
154 Id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 See id. at 1009-10 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
156 Id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
158 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, forfeitures of drugs, drug producing
equipment, drug containers, and property used in drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a) (7) (1981 & Supp. 1996), provide an innocent owner with a defense as follows:
"no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an
owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."
161 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164 See id. at 1004-5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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car was not to commit acts of lewdness. 16 5 Second, the car did not
actually facilitate the crime.166 Justice Stevens emphasized that, on
one occasion, the car merely served as an enclosure for the sexual act,
which could have occurred anywhere.' 67 Thus, he felt that the nexus
between the crime and the property was insufficient to justify
forfeiture. 168
Next, Justice Stevens criticized the State's attempt to categorize
the forfeiture of the Bennis automobile as purely remedial. 169 He
noted that confiscation of the car in no way prevented Mr. Bennis
from engaging a prostitute in other venues; nor was the car itself a
"nuisance" without the sexual activity.'70 Thus, he concluded that
Michigan's remedial interest did not justify the confiscation. 17'
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Stevens voiced his belief
that "[f] undamental fairness" prohibited the punishment of innocent
individuals. 172 He asserted that the majority mischaracterized the rule
of the Court's prior holdings as mandating an owner's strict liability
for wrongful use of his property.173 Furthermore, he noted that the
Austin Court surveyed the same precedents and concluded that each
decision rested, at a minimum, on the belief that the property owner
was negligent in allowing his property to be misused. 174 As the State
conceded that Mrs. Bennis was in no way negligent in allowing Mr.
Bennis to use the car, Justice Stevens felt that forfeiture was
improper.175
165 See id. at 1005 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Van Oster v. United States, 272 U.S. 465
(1926); J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Harmony v.
United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 6 (1827))
(citations omitted).
166 Id. Justice Stevens cited to several cases for similar propositions. For example, he
noted that the offense giving rise to forfeiture of a car in Van Oster included transportation
as an element. Id. (citing Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466 (forfeiture of a car for the illegal
transport of alcohol)). Justice Stevens also referred to the Court's decision in J W. Gold-
smithjr.-Grant Co., which discussed "the adaptability of a particular form of property to an
illegal purpose." i at 1006 (quotingj.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 513)).
167 1d. at 1006 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens also highlighted the Michigan
Supreme Court's theory that the car contributed the ongoing nuisance condition of the
neighborhood. Id. at n.9 (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 527 N.W.2d 483, 491 (Mich. 1994)).
He pointed out that a "bizarre consequence" of the Michigan Supreme Court's theory was
that if Mr. Bennis had parked the car somewhere else during the sexual activity, the car
may not have been subject to forfeiture. I&.
168 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 1006-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170 Id at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
175 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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As further support for his proposition that the forfeiture of-
fended due process, Justice Stevens noted the punitive nature of for-
feiture and cited cases in which, albeit in other contexts, the Court
determined that a person could not constitutionally be punished with-
out a showing of wrongdoing. 176 He suggested that the Court should
now hold, as it always had assumed, that due process requires proof of
guilt for the imposition of punishment. 177 Furthermore, Justice Ste-
vens opined that the facts of the case demonstrated that Mrs. Bennis
was truly innocent; thus, he concluded that the "seizure constituted an
arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law."17
Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by stating that the forfeiture
clearly violated the Eighth Amendment. 179 First, he criticized the ma-
jority's decision as "dramatically at odds with" the holding in Austin.I 0
He noted that even a modest penalty is out of proportion to Mrs. Ben-
nis' guilt.1 ' Although Justice Stevens declined to draw a bright line
between the permissible and impermissible forfeiture of an innocent
owner's property, he felt that the "blatant unfairness" of the Bennis
forfeiture made it unconstitutional. 182
E. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S DISSENT
In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy addressed the well-recog-
nized tradition of forfeiture under maritime and admiralty law. 183 He
also noted its justification of compensating the injuries caused by the
vessels and the difficulty of locating the vessels' owners or ascertaining
the owner's culpability.1 84 However, he emphasized that even the tra-
dition of admiralty forfeiture law could not justify a rule stating that,
in all instances, a vessel may be seized for criminal activity conducted
without the owner's consent or knowledge.1 85 Thus, he reasoned that
the Court could maintain the validity of its admiralty forfeiture deci-
176 Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher,
238 U.S. 482, 490-91 (1915) ("invalidating penalty under Due Process Clause for conduct
that involved 'no intentional wrongdoing; no departure from any prescribed or known
standard of action, and no reckless conduct'")).
177 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178 Id at 1008-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also asserted that the secon-
dary rationales advanced for strict liability for property owners, namely deterrence and
relieving the State of the difficulty of proving collusion between the wrongdoer and the
property owner, were not supported in this case. Id. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 1010 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
180 Id. (Stevens, J, dissenting).
181 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182 It (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185 Rdt (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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sions without extending their application to Mrs. Bennis's case.' 86
Moreover, he distinguished Bennis from the admiralty precedents be-
cause the Bennis vehicle was not used to transport contraband. 187
Justice Kennedy expressed his view that the forfeiture did not
meet the requirements of due process because the Michigan Supreme
Court did not premise its decision to abate the vehicle on Mrs. Ben-
nis's negligence or complicity with respect to her husband's illegal
activity.'88 Justice Kennedy concluded that nothing in the record sup-
ported the notion "that the value of her co-ownership is so insignifi-
cant as to be beneath the law's protection."189
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that although the majority's opinion claimed to
be grounded in a "long and unbroken line" of precedent upholding
the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property, the decision actually
and unnecessarily extended the applicability of its prior decisions.
Had the majority examined and applied the rationales underlying
prior cases, it would have determined that the forfeiture of Mrs. Ben-
nis's interest in the automobile was unjustified. Instead, the Court
perpetuated the unfairness admittedly resulting from punishing one
who is not guilty of wrongdoing.
This Note also argues that the majority failed to address the limi-
tation that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment im-
posed on the forfeiture in this case. The Court should have
recognized that the forfeiture was at least partially punitive and, under
Austin, remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether
the punishment was unconstitutionally excessive.
A. FORFEITURE OF MRS. BENNIS'S INTEREST IN THE CAR IS NOT
JUSTIFIED
The majority's interpretation and application of the innocent
owner forfeiture precedents reflects a superficial and overly-broad
reading of those cases.' 90 Furthermore, the Bennis case is distinguish-
able from the precedents on which the majority rely.19' Thus, the ma-
jority could have determined the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in
the vehicle to be unconstitutional without overruling the admiralty
186 See id& (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (KennedyJ, dissenting).
188 Id. (KennedyJ, dissenting).
189 Id. at 1011 (KennedyJ., dissenting).
190 See id.; i& at 1010-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191 See id at 1005-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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and illegal transport cases.' 9 2 Moreover, the rationales advanced by
the Court for the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property in the
precedents do not support the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in
the automobile. As such, the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest is not
justified and should have been reversed.
1. The Guilty Property Fiction and Its Underlying Rationales
In reviewing the admiralty cases, specifically The Palmyra and Har-
mony, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the Supreme Court's prior
determination that in those in rem admiralty forfeiture proceedings,
the offense attached to the vessel. 19 3 The vessel was considered "guilty
property," thus, the guilt or innocence of the ship owner was irrele-
vant. 194 However, the majority failed to acknowledge the rationales
advanced for attaching the offense to the ships. Consequently, the
Court neglected to determine the rationales' applicability to civil for-
feiture as used today, generally, and, specifically, to the abatement of a
vehicle in which an alleged act of prostitution occurred.
A primary justification for treating the vessel as "guilty property"
under admiralty law was the difficulty in locating or obtaining jurisdic-
tion over the ship-owner. 195 Consequently, proceeding against the
ship directly was the only way of ensuring a remedy for or indemnifi-
cation to the injured party.196
Another rationale advanced for attaching the offense directly to
the vessel was that under certain admiralty forfeiture provisions, there
was no statutory means for proceeding against the property owner
himself.'9 7 Thus, the forfeiture statutes would have been inoperable if
application was dependent upon first convicting a ship owner of some
wrongdoing.'98
Applying these justifications to the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's in-
terest in the Bennises' jointly-owned car reveals that they do not sus-
tain the confiscation. First, because Mrs. Bennis is a Michigan
resident, the State clearly had jurisdiction over her. Similarly, because
Mr. Bennis is also a Michigan resident, compensation or indemnifica-
tion for any injury resulting from Mr. Bennis's nuisance-use of the car
192 See id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
M See id. at 998.
194 Id. at 998.
195 See Piety, supra note 19, at 936-38 (discussing Holmes's theory for the use of the
.guilty property" in admiralty law).
196 See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844); Piety, supra note 19,
at 936-38.
'97 SeeThe Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827) (noting that there was no authori-




could be addressed in a Michigan court.199 As a result, the State did
not need to proceed against the vehicle for lack of jurisdiction over
-the owners or to ensure a remedy for an injured party.
Additionally, as Mr. Bennis's guilt in the underlying offense, lewd-
ness, was previously adjudicated, the State did not need to proceed
against the car directly or Mr. and Mrs. Bennis jointly. Unlike the
piracy forfeiture act in Harmony, Michigan maintains a statutory mech-
anism to proceed against the property owner for the illegal conduct in
which the car was used.200 Consequently, the State had adequate
means of enforcing its nuisance abatement statute and did not need
to proceed against the car without respect to or determination of the
owners' guilt. 20 1 As such, the primary rationales used by the federal
governmdnt in confiscating ships irrespective of the ship-owner's guilt
in the admiralty cases do not apply to the State's forfeiture of Mrs.
Bennis's interest in the car. Thus, in this case, the Court upheld the
forfeiture of an innocent owner's property in a context that is beyond
the scope of the initial application of such forfeitures under American
law.
2. The Entrustment Theoty and Its Far-reaching Ramifications
Similarly, the majority failed to address the underlying rationales
behind the prior cases upholding the forfeiture of property when an
innocent owner entrusts the property to one who then misuses it. The
primary rationales advanced for allowing the forfeiture of such prop-
erty are that it builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use by
relieving the government of the obligation to prove complicity be-
tween the owner and the wrongdoer,20 2 and that it may deter owners
from transferring property to those who may misuse it.203 Although
Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the language from Van Oster and
Calero-Toledo which advances these rationales, 204 he did not examine
their applicability to the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest.
For three reasons, the "entrustnent" theory rationales are not ap-
plicable to Mrs. Bennis's case. First, the forfeiture of the automobile
199 Mr. Bennis was, in fact, criminally prosecuted in Michigan for gross indecency.
200 Mr. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency pursuant to MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 750.338b (West 1991 & Supp 1996). See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
201 This argument applies to both Mr. and Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car. However,
the argument has particular force with respect to Mrs. Bennis's interest because, while the
State had an adequate means to suppress the offense of lewdness through its gross inde-
cency statute, the State had to circumvent that statute and attach the offense directly to the
car to forfeit Mrs. Bennis's interest.
202 See Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926).
203 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688 (1974).
204 See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998-99 (1996).
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can serve no deterrent purpose with respect to Mrs. Bennis because
she could not have known that Mr. Bennis would use the car to solicit
prostitutes.2 05 As such, the threat of forfeiture of the vehicle as a con-
sequence of such use would not have altered her behavior. Mrs. Ben-
nis would not have taken steps to prevent the illegal conduct or
refrained from allowing her husband to drive the car despite the pos-
sibility of forfeiture.
Second, there was no "entrustment" or transfer of possession to
deter in this case. As ajoint-owner of the car, Mr. Bennis was entitled
to use it at all times. Justice Ginsburg, however, asserted that as a
joint-owner with Mrs. Bennis, Mr. Bennis had her consent to use the
car at all times.20 6 Justice Ginsburg's suggestion of treating joint-own-
ership as a form of consent or entrustment sufficient tojustify forfei-
ture of an otherwise innocent owner's property not only exceeds the
application of the entrustment theory in prior forfeiture cases,20 7 but
it would also have staggeringly far-reaching consequences. All items
of business property or marital property would be subject to forfeiture
for the wrongdoings of any of the co-owners and the threat of forfei-
ture could work as a deterrent against joint-ownership.
Finally, in some cases, the government may be justified in forfeit-
ing property without a showing of guilt on the part of the property
owner due to the difficulty of proving that the owner allowed the
wrongdoer to use the property knowing or consenting to the fact that
it would be used illegally. However, in this case, the State conceded
that Mrs. Bennis did not know of or consent to her husband's illegal
acts. Thus, the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis' interest in the car cannot be
premised on relieving the State from the obligation of proving her
complicity in the crime.
3. The Majority Opinion Represents an Unfair and Unnecessary Extension
of Precedent
Eight justices acknowledged that the imposition of punishment
without a showing of guilt may be unfair.208 Four members of the
205 See id at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the car was not
primarily used to provide a location for engaging a prostitute nor was a vehicle a necessary
element for Mr. Bennis's offense. Id. at 1005. Thus, it is likely that Mrs. Bennis could not
have foreseen and consequently prevented the conduct.
206 Id at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
207 The forfeiture precedents involve relationships in which the owner explicitly author-
ized the wrongdoer to use the property. For example, in Caero-Toledo and Dobbins's Distil-
lery, there was a lessor-lessee relationship between the owner and the wrongful-user, and in
the admiralty cases the ship-owner entrusted the operation of the ship to the ship-master.




Court concluded that forfeiture of a truly innocent owner's property
is a violation of due process. 20 9 Furthermore, the forfeiture cases
upon which ChiefJustice Rehnquist relied have consistently acknowl-
edged that innocent owners may be afforded some constitutional pro-
tection. jW Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States2 0 reserved the
question of the constitutionality of forfeiting property that was stolen
from the innocent owner.21' Calero-Toledo went as far as intimating
constitutional protection for an owner who did "all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property."2 12
Additionally, the Court in Austin opined that all of the previous inno-
cent owner forfeitures were premised on the owner's negligence in
allowing his property to be misused.213 The decisions in these cases
indicate not only that the Constitution should protect a truly innocent
owner from forfeiture due to the wrongdoings of others, but also that
a viable standard for who is an innocent owner is one who was not
negligent in allowing his property to be misused.
The Bennis Court could have adopted this standard and provided
the constitutional protection to innocent owners that the prior deci-
sions intimated existed. Instead, the Court in Bennis dismissed the
Calero-Toledo Court's statement as obiter dictum and extended, beyond
their underlying rationales, the applicability of its prior innocent
owner forfeiture holdings. Had the Court adopted the Calero-Toledo
Court's reasoning, it could have determined that the forfeiture of Mrs.
Bennis' interest was unconstitutional, without overruling precedent,
and continued on the course that it apparently had been undertaking
to afford innocent owners constitutional protection.
B. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED AN EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
ANALYSIS
In Austin, the Supreme Court determined that the Eighth
209 See i4 at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
211 M at 512.
212 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. Further support for the notion that the Calero-Toledo
"negligence" standard should be used for determining the constitutionality of a forfeiture
derives from the fact that several circuits have adopted the "Calero-Toledo Standard" or "all
reasonable efforts" standard for determining merit of an "innocent owner" defense under
the federal drug forfeiture statute. See, e.g., United States v. 1012 Germantown Road, 963
F.2d 1496, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that the intimation of constitutional
constraint in the Calero-Toledo decision is not binding, but electing to adopt the standard to
define "consent" in the innocent owner defense of the Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (1981 & Supp. 1996)); United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870,
879 (2d Cir. 1990). But cf. United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14 and 15, 869 F.2d 942, 946-47
(6th Cir. 1989).
213 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993).
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Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, which was meant to limit the
government's power to punish, applied to both civil and criminal ac-
tions, as long as they were punitive in nature.2 1 4 The Austin Court
surveyed the history of civil forfeiture in English common law and in
the United States, including much of the same precedents that
formed the basis for the Bennis majority's opinion, and concluded that
civil forfeiture serves, at least in part, as punishment.215 Furthermore,
the Austin Court stated that a forfeiture statute may serve remedial or
other purposes, in addition to punitive goals, and still be subject to
the Excessive Fines Clause limitation.21 6 Thus, after Austin, unless a
civil forfeiture proceeding serves no punitive purpose, it is constitu-
tionally restricted by the Eighth Amendment.
The Bennis majority, however, neglected to address the constitu-
tional constraint imposed by the Eighth Amendment. Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that Michigan's nuisance abatement proceeding "is
an equitable action" in which the trial judge may consider "alterna-
tives [to] abating the entire interest in the vehicle,"21 7 and asserted
that the forfeiture serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any puni-
tive aim.218 However, a deterrent purpose and remedial discretion do
not obviate the limitations imposed by the Excessive Fines Clause un-
less the forfeiture serves no punitive purpose.219 Thus, Chief Justice
Rehnquist should have extended his analysis of the purpose of Michi-
gan's nuisance abatement statute to determine whether the statute
punished Mrs. Bennis by forfeiting her interest in the car.
Although Justice Thomas' concurrence did not directly address
the Excessive Fines Clause limitation, he attempted to characterize the
forfeiture of the Bennis' automobile as strictly remedial in order to
avoid the dilemma of punishing Mrs. Bennis absent a finding of
wrongdoing.220 This remedial characterization is problematic be-
cause, even assuming, as Justice Thomas does,221 that all of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the car were used to defray the costs of
prosecution and law enforcement against the nuisance-use of the car,
the forfeiture may still serve a punitive goal. Thus, a more complete
214 Id. at 613, 618.
215 See. id. 613-618.
216 See i. at 610.
217 Bennis, 116 S. Ct at 1000 (quoting Bennis v. Michigan, 527 N.W. 2d 483, 495 (Mich.
1994)) (brackets in original).
218 Id.
219 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
220 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas,J., concurring). Justice Thomas does not state
that the Excessive Fines limitation would be one of'the problems involved with imposing
punishment on an innocent owner.
221 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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analysis of the purpose of forfeiture would be necessary to dismiss the
applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause.
Only Justice Stevens directly addressed the Eighth Amendment
limitation on the forfeiture of the Bennis automobile. 22 Justice Ste-
vens correctly analyzed the nature of the Michigan nuisance abate-
ment statute and rejected the State's argument that forfeiture
pursuant to the statute was purely remedial. The State had argued in
an earlier stage of the litigation that seizing the Bennis's automobile
was "swift and 'certain punishment"'223 and the majority "conceded"
that civil forfeiture serves in part to punish.224 Furthermore, as the
majority noted, forfeiture serves a deterrent purpose and imposes a
penalty, rendering illegal-use of property unprofitable,225 which is
punishment for all intents and purposes.226 For these reasons, forfeit-
ures pursuant to Michigan's nuisance abatement statute, and the Ben-
nis forfeiture in particular, are at least partially punitive. As such, the
limitation of the Excessive Fines Clause should apply to the Bennis
forfeiture.
The Austin Court declined in that case to establish a rule for de-
termining when a forfeiture is excessive, nor has the Supreme Court
established a standard since that decision.2 27 Furthermore, the Austin
Court stated that "[p] rudence dictates" allowing the lower courts to
formulate the proper analysis.228 As such, the Bennis Court should
have remanded the case for determination of the excessiveness of the
forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis interest in the jointly owned car.
222 See id. at 1010 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens determined that the forfeiture
of Mrs. Bennis's interest was constitutionally excessive. i. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Stevens also pointed
out that the State's argument that the confiscation of the automobile was remedial because
it abated a public nuisance was unpersuasive for two reasons. I . (StevensJ, dissenting).
First, unlike confiscation of a burglar's tools, taking Mr. Bennis's car would not prevent
him from committing his illegal acts. See i. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, the car only
constituted a nuisance because it was parked in an area reputed for prostitution at the time
of the illegal act. Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting). Thus,Justice Stevens reasoned that the need
to abate the vehicle disappeared when the car left the neighborhood. Id. (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). In concluding that the forfeiture was punishment in this case, Justice Stevens
also relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989),
which stated a civil sanction which serves retributive or deterrent purposes "is punishment,
as we have come to understand the term." Id. at 1007 n.10 (StevensJ, dissenting) (quot-
ing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448)).
224 Id. at 1006-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing is. at 1000).
225 Id. at 1000 (citation omitted).
226 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
227 Justice O'Connor proposed a standard for the application of the Excessive Fines
Clause in her dissent in Browning-Fenris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Keco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 300-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
228 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding Mrs. Bennis's lack of knowledge of or consent to
the illegal activity, the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of inter-
est in a car in which the joint-owner, her husband, committed an act
of lewdness with an alleged prostitute. The Court based its decision
on the "well-established authority rejecting the innocent-owner de-
fense" to civil forfeiture.229 However, had the majority examined
more closely the precedent upon which it relied, it would have discov-
ered that rejecting Mrs. Bennis's innocent owner defense actually and
unjustifiably expanded the scope of its prior holdings. Furthermore,
as the forfeiture in this case arguably served punitive aims, the major-
ity should have analyzed Mrs. Bennis's claim within the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause limitation and remanded the case
to the lower court for determination of the excessiveness of the
forfeiture.
JAMI BRODEY
229 Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
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